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Abstract. Temporal synthesis is the automated design of a system that interacts
with an environment, using the declarative specification of the system’s behavior.
A popular language for providing such a specification is Linear Temporal Logic,
or LTL. LTL synthesis in the general case has remained, however, a hard problem
to solve in practice. Because of this, many works have focused on developing syn-
thesis procedures for specific fragments of LTL, with an easier synthesis problem.
In this work, we focus on Safety LTL, defined here to be the Until-free fragment
of LTL in Negation Normal Form (NNF), and shown to express a fragment of safe
LTL formulas. The intrinsic motivation for this fragment is the observation that in
many cases it is not enough to say that something “good” will eventually happen,
we need to say by when it will happen. We show here that Safety LTL synthesis is
significantly simpler algorithmically than LTL synthesis. We exploit this simplic-
ity in two ways, first by describing an explicit approach based on a reduction to
Horn-SAT, which can be solved in linear time in the size of the game graph, and
then through an efficient symbolic construction, allowing a BDD-based symbolic
approach which significantly outperforms extant LTL-synthesis tools.
1 Introduction
Research on synthesis is the culmination of the ideal of declarative programming. By
describing a system in terms of what it should do, rather than how it should be done,
we are able to simplify the design process while also avoiding human mistakes. In the
framework defined by synthesis, we describe a specification of a system’s behavior in a
formal language, and the synthesis procedure automatically designs a system satisfying
this specification [30]. Reactive synthesis [24] is one of the most popular variants of this
problem, in which we wish to synthesize a system that interacts continuously with an
environment. Such systems include, for example, operating systems and controllers for
mechanical devices. To specify the behavior of such systems, we need a specification
language that can reason about changes over time. A popular such language is Linear
Temporal Logic, or LTL [23].
Despite extensive research, however, synthesis from LTL formulas remains a diffi-
cult problem. The classical approach is based on translating the formula to a determin-
istic parity automaton and reducing the synthesis problem to solving a parity game [24].
This translation, however, is not only theoretically hard, given its doubly-exponential
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upper bound, but also inefficient in practice due to the lack of practical algorithms for
determinization [15]. Furthermore, despite the recent quasi-polynomial algorithm [7]
for parity games, it is still not known if they can be solved efficiently. A promising
approach to mitigating this problem consists of developing synthesis techniques for
certain fragments of LTL that cover interesting classes of specifications but for which
the synthesis problem is easier. Possibly the most notable example is that of General-
ized Reactivity(1) formulas, or GR(1) [3], a fragment for which the synthesis problem
can be solved in cubic time with respect to the game graph.
Here we focus on the Safety LTL fragment, which we define to be the fragment of
LTL composed of Until-free formulas in Negation Normal Form (NNF). Such formulas
express safety properties, meaning that every violating trace has a finite bad prefix that
falsifies the formula [19]. The intrinsic motivation for this fragment is the observation
that in many cases it is not enough to say that something “good” will eventually happen,
we need to say by when it will happen [21]. For this strict subset of LTL, the synthesis
problem can be reduced to a safety game, which is far easier to solve. In fact, for such
a game the solution can be computed in linear time with respect to the game graph [1].
Some novel techniques for safety game solving have been developed in the context
of the Annual Synthesis Competition (SyntComp) 3, but there the input consists of an
AIGER model, while in this paper we are concerned with synthesis from Safety LTL
formulas. See further discussion in the Concluding Remarks.
Our first contribution is a new solution to safety games by reducing to Horn satisfi-
ability (Horn-SAT). There have been past works using SAT in the context of bounded
synthesis [2], but our approach is novel in using a reduction to Horn-SAT, which can
be solved in linear time [11]. Because, however, the Horn formula is proportional to the
size of the state graph, in which the number of transitions is exponential in the num-
ber of input/output variables and the number of states can be in the worst case doubly
exponential in the size of the Safety LTL formula, this approach becomes infeasible for
larger instances. To avoid this problem, we pursue an alternative approach that uses a
symbolic representation of the game graph via Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [5].
Symbolic solutions to safety games have played an important part in LTL synthe-
sis tools following the idea of Safraless synthesis [20], which avoids the high cost of
determinization and the parity acceptance condition of classical LTL synthesis by in-
stead employing a translation to universal co-Bu¨chi automata. Unbeast [14], a symbolic
BDD-based tool for bounded synthesis, decomposes the LTL specification into safety
and non-safety parts, using an incremental bound to allow the non-safety part to also
be encoded as a safety game. Another tool, Acacia+ [4], takes a bounded synthesis ap-
proach that allows the synthesis problem to be reduced to a safety game, then explores
the structure of the resulting game to implement a symbolic antichain-based algorithm.
In the above approaches the safety game is constructed from a co-Bu¨chi automaton
of the LTL specification. Our insight in this paper is that, since every bad trace of a for-
mula in the Safety LTL fragment has a finite prefix, we can construct from the negation
of such a formula a deterministic finite automaton that accepts exactly the language
corresponding to bad prefixes. This DFA can be seen as the dual of a safety automaton
defining a safety game over the same state space. Using a DFA as the basis for our safety
3 http://www.syntcomp.org/
game allows us to leverage tools and techniques developed for symbolic construction,
determinization and minimization of finite automata.
Our symbolic synthesis framework is inspired by a recent approach [29] for syn-
thesis of LTL over finite traces. This problem can be seen as the dual of Safety LTL
synthesis, and as such we can inter-reduce the realizability problem between the two
by negating the result. Nevertheless, the strategy generation is irreducible since the two
problems are solving the game for different players. Therefore, we modify the algorithm
to produce a strategy for the safety game instead. The procedure consists of two phases.
First we construct symbolically a safety automaton from the Safety LTL formula instead
of direct construction. For that we present a translation from the negation of Safety LTL
to first-order logic over finite traces, which allows us to symbolically construct the dual
DFA of the safety automaton. Second, we solve the safety game by computing the set of
winning states through a backwards symbolic fixpoint computation, and then applying
a boolean-synthesis procedure [16] to symbolically construct a strategy.
In summary, our contribution in this paper is to introduce a fragment of LTL called
Safety LTL and present two approaches for the synthesis problem for this fragment, an
explicit one based on a reduction to Horn-SAT and a symbolic one exploiting techniques
for symbolic DFA construction. Since Safety LTL is a fragment of general LTL, existing
LTL synthesis tools can likewise be used to solve the Safety LTL synthesis problem. To
demonstrate the benefits of developing specialized synthesis techniques, we perform an
experimental comparison with Unbeast and Acacia+, both tools for general LTL synthe-
sis. Our results show that the explicit approach is able to outperform these tools when
the formula is small, while the symbolic approach has the best performance overall.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Safety/Co-safety LTL
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), first introduced in [23], extends propositional logic by in-
troducing temporal operators. Given a set P of propositions, the syntax of LTL formulas
is defined as φ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | φ1Uφ2.
> and ⊥ represent true and false respectively. p ∈ P is an atom, and we define a
literal l to be an atom or the negation of an atom. X (Next) and U (Until) are tempo-
ral operators. We also introduce the dual operator of U , namely R (Release), defined
as φ1Rφ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1U¬φ2). Additionally, we define the abbreviations Fφ ≡ >Uφ
and Gφ ≡ ⊥Rφ. Standard boolean abbreviations, such as ∨ (or) and→ (implies) are
also used. An LTL formula φ is Until-free/Release-free iff it does not contain the Un-
til/Release operator. Moreover, we say φ is in Negation Normal Form (NNF), iff all
negation operators in φ are pushed only in front of atoms.
A trace ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is a sequence of propositional interpretations (sets), in which
ρm ∈ 2P (m ≥ 0) is the m-th interpretation of ρ, and |ρ| represents the length of ρ.
Intuitively, ρm is interpreted as the set of propositions which are true at instantm. Trace
ρ is an infinite trace if |ρ| = ∞, which is formally denoted as ρ ∈ (2P)ω . Otherwise ρ
is a finite trace, denoted as ρ ∈ (2P)∗. LTL formulas are interpreted over infinite traces.
Given an infinite trace ρ and an LTL formula φ, we inductively define when φ is true in
ρ at step i (i ≥ 0), written ρ, i |= φ, as follows:
– ρ, i |= > and ρ, i 6|= ⊥;
– ρ, i |= p iff p ∈ ρi;
– ρ, i |= ¬φ iff ρ, i 6|= φ;
– ρ, i |= φ1 ∧ φ2, iff ρ, i |= φ1 and ρ, i |= φ2;
– ρ, i |= Xφ, iff ρ, i+ 1 |= φ;
– ρ, i |= φ1Uφ2, iff there exists j ≥ i such that ρ, j |= φ2, and for all i ≤ k < j, we
have ρ, k |= φ1.
An LTL formula φ is true in ρ, denoted by ρ |= φ, if and only if ρ, 0 |= φ.
Informally speaking, a safe LTL formula rejects traces whose “badness” follows
from a finite prefix. Dually, a co-safe LTL formula accepts traces whose “goodness”
follows from a finite prefix. Thus, φ is a safe formula iff ¬φ is a co-safe formula. To
define the safe/co-safe formulas, we need to introduce the concept of bad/good prefix.
Definition 1 (Bad/Good Prefix [19]). Consider a language L of infinite words over P .
A finite word x over P is a bad/good prefix for L if and only if for all infinite words y
over P , the concatenation x · y of x and y isn’t/is in L.
Safe/co-safe LTL formulas are defined as follows.
Definition 2 (safe/co-safe [19]). An LTL formula φ is safe/co-safe iff every word that
violates/satisfies φ has a bad/good prefix.
We use pref(φ) to denote the set of bad prefixes for safe formula φ, equivalently,
we denote by co-pref(¬φ), the set of good prefixes for ¬φ, which is co-safe. Indeed,
pref(φ) = co-pref(¬φ) [19].
Theorem 1. An LTL formula φ is safe iff ¬φ is co-safe, and each bad prefix for safe
formula φ is a good prefix for ¬φ.
Checking if a given LTL formula is safe/co-safe is PSPACE-complete [19]. We now
introduce a fragment of LTL where safety/co-safety is a syntactical feature.
Theorem 2 ([26]). If an LTL formula φ in NNF is Until-free/Release-free, then φ is
safe/co-safe.
Motivated by this theorem, we define now the syntactic fragment of Safety/Co-
Safety LTL.
Definition 3. Safety/Co-Safety LTL formulas are in NNF and Until-free/Release-free,
respectively.
Remark: To the best of our knowledge, it is an open question whether every safe LTL
formula is equivalent to some Safety LTL formula. We conjecture that this is the case.
2.2 Boolean Synthesis
In this paper, we utilize the boolean synthesis technique proposed in [16].
Definition 4 (Boolean Synthesis [16]). Given two disjoint atom sets I,O of input
and output variables, respectively, and a boolean formula ξ over I ∪ O, the boolean-
synthesis problem is to construct a function γ : 2I → 2O such that, for all I ∈ 2I , if
there exists O ∈ 2O such that I ∪O |= ξ, then I ∪ γ(I) |= ξ. We call γ the implemen-
tation function.
We treat boolean synthesis as a black box, applying it to the key operation of Safety
LTL synthesis proposed in this paper. For more details on algorithms and techniques for
boolean synthesis we refer to [16].
3 Safety LTL Synthesis
In this section we give the definition of Safety LTL synthesis. We then show how this
problem can be modeled as a safety game played over a kind of deterministic automaton,
called a safety automaton. In the following sections we describe approaches to construct
this automaton from a Safety LTL formula and solve the game that it specifies.
Definition 5 (Safety LTL Synthesis). Let φ be an LTL formula over an alphabet P and
X ,Y be two disjoint atom sets such thatX ∪Y = P .X is the set of input (environment)
variables and Y is the set of output (controller) variables. φ is realizable with respect
to 〈X ,Y〉 if there exists a strategy g : (2X )∗ → 2Y , such that for an arbitrary infinite
sequence X0, X1, . . . ∈ (2X )ω , φ is true in the infinite trace ρ = (X0 ∪ g(X0)), (X1 ∪
g(X0, X1)), (X2 ∪ g(X0, X1, X2)) . . .. The synthesis procedure is to compute such a
strategy if φ is realizable.
There are two versions of the Safety LTL synthesis, depending on the first player.
Here we consider that the environment moves first, but the version where the controller
moves first can be obtained by a small modification.
The Safety LTL synthesis is a subset of LTL synthesis by restricting the property
to be a Safety LTL formula. Therefore, we can use general LTL-synthesis methods to
solve the Safety LTL synthesis problem. Classical approaches to LTL synthesis problems
involve two steps: 1) Convert the LTL formula to a deterministic automaton; 2) Reduce
LTL synthesis to an infinite game over the automaton. We now present the automata
corresponding to the class of Safety LTL formulas.
Definition 6 (Deterministic Safety Automata). A deterministic safety automaton (DSA)
is a tuple As = (2P , S, s0, δ), where 2P is the alphabet, S is a finite set of states with
s0 as the initial state, and δ : S × 2P → S is a partial transition function. Given an
infinite trace ρ ∈ (2P)ω , a run r of ρ on As is a sequence of states s0, s1, s2, . . . such
that si+1 = δ(si, ρi). ρ is accepted by As if As has an infinite run r of ρ.
Note that in the definition, δ is a partial function, meaning that given s ∈ S and
a ∈ 2P , δ(s, a) can either return a state s′ ∈ S or be undefined. Thus, an infinite run
of ρ on As may not exist due to the possibility of δ(si, ρi) being undefined for some
(si, ρi). A DSA is essentially a deterministic Bu¨chi automaton (DBA) [6] with a partial
transition function and a set of accepting states F = S.
Deterministic safety games are games between two players, the environment and
the controller, played over a DSA. We have two disjoint sets of variables X and Y . X
contains uncontrollable variables, which are under the control of the environment. Y
contains controllable variables, which are under the control of the controller. A round
consists of both the controller and the environment setting the value of the variables they
control. A play of the game is a word ρ ∈ (2X∪Y)ω that describes how the environment
and the controller set values to the variables during each round. A run of the game is
the corresponding sequence of states through the play. The specification of the game is
given by a deterministic safety automaton As = (2X∪Y , S, s0, δ).
A winning play for the controller is an infinite sequence accepted by As. A strategy
for the controller is a function f : (2X )∗ → 2Y such that given a history of the setting
of the environmental variables, f determines how the controller set the controllable
variables in Y . A strategy is a winning strategy if starting from the initial state s0, for
every possible sequence of assignments of the variables in X , it leads to an infinite run.
Checking the existence of such a winning strategy counts for the realizability problem.
Safety games can be seen as duals of reachability games, where reachability games
are won by reaching a set of winning states, while safety games are won by avoiding
a set of losing states. Safety games however cannot be reduced to reachability games.
The realizability problem of safety game can indeed be reduced to that of reachability
game since the two are dual and the underlying game is determined, but this does not
work for strategy generation. Safety game does not generate a winning strategy for the
environment if it is unrealizable. It is known that reachability games can be solved in
linear time in the size of the game graph [1]. One of the ways to do this is by a reduction
to Horn Satisfiability, which can be solved in linear time [11]. In the next section we
present such a reduction.
4 Explicit Approach to Safety Synthesis
We now show how to solve safety games by reducing to Horn satisfiability (Horn-SAT),
a variant of SAT where every clause has at most one positive literal. Horn-SAT is known
to be solvable in linear time using constraint propagation, cf. [11]. Modern SAT solvers
use specialized data structures for performing very fast constraint propagation [22].
From a DSA As = (2X∪Y , S, s0, δ) defining a safety game, we construct a Horn
formula f such that the game is winning for the system if and only if f is satisfiable.
Then, from a satisfying assignment of f we can extract a winning strategy. We now de-
scribe the construction of the Horn formula. There are three kinds of Boolean variables
in f : (1) state variables: ps for each state s ∈ S; (2) state-input variables: p(s,X) for
each state s ∈ S and X ∈ 2X ; (3) state-input-output variables: p(s,X,Y ) for each state
s ∈ S, X ∈ 2X , and Y ∈ 2Y .
We first construct a non-Horn boolean formula f ′, then we show how to obtain a
Horn formula f from f ′. The intuition of the construction is that first, s0 must be a
winning state. Then, for every winning state, for all inputs there should exist an output
such that the corresponding successor is a winning state.
Let n represent the number of possible output assignments: 2Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn},
n = 2|Y|. f ′ is a conjunction of ps0 with the following constraints for each state s ∈ S:
(1) ps → p(s,X), for eachX ∈ 2X ; (2) p(s,X) →
(
p(s,X,Y1) ∨ p(s,X,Y2) ∨ . . . ∨ p(s,X,Yn)
)
,
for eachX ∈ 2X ; (3) p(s,X,Y ) → pδ(s,X,Y ), for eachX ∈ 2X , Y ∈ 2Y , if δ(s,X, Y ) is
well defined ; and (4) ¬p(s,X,Y ), for each X ∈ 2X , Y ∈ 2Y , if δ(s,X, Y ) is undefined.
Theorem 3. The formula f ′ is satisfiable with assignment α′ iff the safety game over
As is realizable and α′ encodes a winning strategy.
Proof. If f ′ is satisfiable with assignment α′, there is a set C ⊆ S of states, where
for each state s ∈ C, it is the case that ps is true in α′. Then, by clauses of type (1),
given a state s ∈ C, for all inputs X ∈ 2X , it is the case that p(s,X) is also true in
α′. Furthermore, by clause of type (2), there must be some output Y ∈ 2Y such that
p(s,X,Y ) is true in α′. Since p(s,X,Y ) is true, there cannot be a clause ¬p(s,X,Y ) of type
(4), and therefore it is the case that δ(s,X, Y ) is well defined and, by clause of type
(3), pδ(s,X,Y ) is also true in α′. This means that we have a wining strategy such that
all states in C, including s0, are winning. In response to input X ∈ 2X , the system
outputs Y ∈ 2Y such that p(s,X,Y ) is true in α′, and this ensures that the successor state
δ(s,X, Y ) is also in C.
If the safety game over As is realizable, then there is a winning strategy g : S ×
2X → 2Y and a set C ⊆ S, containing s0, of winning states such that for each state
s ∈ C and input X ∈ 2X , the output Y = g(s,X) is such that δ(s,X, Y ) ∈ C. Then
the truth assignment α′ that makes ps true iff s ∈ C, and makes p(s,X) and p(s,X,g(s,X))
true for all s ∈ C and X ∈ 2X is a satisfying assignment of f .
We now transform the formula f ′ to an equi-satisfiable formula f that is a Horn for-
mula (in which every clause contains at most one positive literal). We replace each vari-
able ps, p(s,X), and p(s,X,Y ) in f ′ by its negative literal ¬ps, ¬p(s,X), and ¬p(s,X,Y ),
respectively. We can then rewrite each constraint (¬ps → ¬p(s,X)) as (p(s,X) → ps).
Similarly, we can rewrite (¬p(s,X) → (¬p(s,X,Y1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬p(s,X,Yn))) as the equiva-
lent constraint ((p(s,X,Y1) ∧ . . . ∧ p(s,X,Yn)) → p(s,X)). f is equivalent to f ′ with the
polarity of the literals flipped, therefore we have that f is equi-satisfiable to f ′. Given a
satisfying assignment α for f , we obtain a satisfying assignment α′ for f ′ by, for every
variable p, assigning p to be true in α′ iff p is assigned false in α.
Since f is a Horn formula, we can obtain a winning strategy in linear time. Note,
however, that f is constructed from an explicit representation of the DSA As, as a
state graph with one transition per assignment of the input and output variables. The
challenge for this approach is the blow-up in the size of the state graph with respect to
the input temporal formula. To address this challenge we need to be able to express the
state graph more succinctly.
Therefore, we present an alternative approach for solving safety games using a sym-
bolic representation of the state graph. Although the algorithm is no longer linear, not
having to use an explicit representation of the game makes up for that fact. In order to
construct this symbolic representation efficiently, we exploit the fact that safety games
are dual to reachability games played over a DFA, allowing us to use techniques for
symbolic construction of DFAs. This construction is described in the next section.
5 Symbolic Approach to Safety Synthesis
In order to perform Safety-LTL synthesis symbolically, the first step is to construct a
symbolic representation of the DSA from the Safety-LTL formula. The following sec-
tion explains how we can achieve this. The key insight that we use is that a symbolic
representation of the DSA can be derived from the symbolic representation of the DFA
encoding the set of bad prefixes of the Safety-LTL formula, allowing us to exploit tech-
niques for symbolic DFA construction. After this, we describe how we can, from this
representation, symbolically compute the set of winning states of the safety game, and
then extract from them a winning strategy using boolean synthesis.
5.1 From Safety LTL to Deterministic Safety Automata
In this section, we propose a conversion from Safety LTL to DSA. The standard ap-
proach to constructing deterministic automata for LTL formulas is to first convert an
LTL formula to a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton using tools such as SPOT [12],
LTL2BA [17], and then apply a determinization construction, e.g., Safra’s construc-
tion [25]. The conversion from LTL to deterministic automata, however, is intractable in
practice, not only because of the doubly-exponential complexity, but also the non-trivial
construction of both Safra [25] and Safraless [20] approaches. Therefore, LTL synthesis
is able to benefit from a better automata construction technique. One of the contribution
in this paper is proving such a technique which efficiently constructs the corresponding
safety automata of Safety LTL formulas. The novelty here is a much simpler conversion,
thus yielding a more efficient synthesis procedure.
Since every trace rejected by a DSA As can be rejected in a finite number of steps,
we can alternatively define the language accepted by As by the finite prefixes that it
rejects. This allows us to work in the domain of finite words, which can be recognized
much more easily, using deterministic finite automata. Therefore, a DSA can be seen
as the dual of a DFA over the same state space. Given a DFA D = (2P , Sd, s0, λ, Fd),
the corresponding DSA As = (2P , S, s0, δ) can be generated by following steps: 1)
S = Sd\Fd; 2) For s ∈ S, a ∈ 2P , if λ(s, a) = s′ ∈ S, then δ(s, a) = s′, otherwise
δ(s, a) is undefined.
Theorem 4 ([19]). Given a Safety LTL formula φ, there is a DFA Aφ which accepts
exactly the finite traces that are bad prefixes for φ.
Given a Safety LTL formula φ and the corresponding DFA Aφ, we can construct the
DSA Asφ. The correctness of such construction is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For a Safety LTL formula φ, the DSA Asφ = (2P , S, s0, δ), which is dual
to Aφ = (2P , Sd, s0, λ, Fd), accepts exactly the traces that satisfy φ.
Proof. For an infinite trace ρ, ρ |= φ implies that an arbitrary prefix ρ′ of ρ is not a bad
prefix for φ, so ρ′ cannot be accepted by Aφ. Therefore, starting from the initial state
s0, λ always returns some successor s′ /∈ Fd, so the corresponding transition is also in
Asφ. The run r of ρ on A
s
φ is indeed infinite. As a result, ρ |= φ implies that ρ can be
accepted by Asφ.
On the other hand, an infinite trace ρ being accepted by Asφ implies that the run
r of ρ on Asφ is infinite. Therefore, starting from the initial state s0, partial function δ
can always return some successor s′ ∈ S, for which s′ /∈ Fd. There is a corresponding
transition in Aφ for each transition in Asφ, then an arbitrary prefix ρ
′ of ρ is indeed can
not be accepted by Aφ, such that ρ′ is not a bad prefix. As a result, ρ can be accepted
by Asφ implies that ρ |= φ.
Based on Theorem 5, the construction of the DSA relies on the construction of the
DFA for the Safety formula φ. Therefore, we can leverage the techniques and tools
developed for DFA construction. Although it still cannot avoid the doubly-exponential
complexity, DFA construction is much simpler than that of ω-automata (e.g. parity [25],
or co-Bu¨chi [20]). Consider a Safety LTL formula φ. From Theorem 1 and 4, we know
that ¬φ, which is co-safe, can be interpreted over finite words. Thus, we can construct
the DFA Aφ from ¬φ.
DFA construction Summarily, the DFA construction is processed as follows: Given a
Safety LTL formula φ, we first negate it to obtain a Co-Safety LTL formula ¬φ. Taking
the translation described below, which restricts the interpretation of¬φ over finite linear
ordered traces, we can obtain a first-order logic formula fol(). The DFA for such fol()
is obviously able to accept exactly the set of bad prefixes for φ (or say, good prefixes
for ¬φ).
Consider an infinite trace σ = ρ0ρ1 · · · ρn>> · · · that satisfies the Co-Safety LTL
formula ψ = ¬φ in NNF, where the finite prefix ρ = ρ0ρ1 · · · ρn of σ is a good prefix
for ψ. The corresponding FOL interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) of ρ is defined as follows:
∆I = {0, 1, 2, · · · , last}, where last = |ρ| − 1. For each p ∈ P , its interpretation
pI = {i | p ∈ ρ(i)}. Intuitively, pI is interpreted as the set of positions where p is true
in ρ. Then we can generate a corresponding FOL formula that opens in x by a function
fol(ψ, x) from the Co-Safety LTL formula and a variable x where 0 ≤ x ≤ last, which
is defined as follows:
– fol(p, x) = p(x) and fol(¬p, x) = ¬p(x)
– fol(ψ1 ∧ ψ2, x) = fol(ψ1, x) ∧ fol(ψ2, x)
– fol(ψ1 ∨ ψ2, x) = fol(ψ1, x) ∨ fol(ψ2, x)
– fol(Xψ, x) = ∃y.succ(x, y) ∧ fol(ψ, y)
– fol(ψ1Uψ2, x) = ∃y.x ≤ y ≤ last ∧ fol(ψ2, y) ∧ ∀z.x ≤ z < y → fol(ψ1, z)
In the above, the notation succ denotes that y is the successor of x. The following
theorem guarantees a finite trace ρ is a good prefix of the Co-Safety LTL formula ψ iff
the corresponding interpretation I of ρ models fol(ψ, 0).
Theorem 6. Given a Co-Safety LTL formula ψ, a finite trace ρ and the corresponding
interpretation I of ρ, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff I |= fol(ψ, 0).
Proof. We prove the theorem by the induction over the structure of ψ.
– Basically, if ψ = p is an atom, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff p ∈ ρ0. By the definition
of I, we have that 0 ∈ pI . As a result, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff I |= fol(p, 0).
Moreover, if ψ = ¬p where p is an atom, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff p 6∈ ρ0, and iff
0 6∈ pI , finally iff I |= fol(¬p, 0) holds;
– If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, ρ is a good prefix for ψ implies ρ is a good prefix for both ψ1 and
ψ2. By induction hypothesis, it is true that I |= fol(ψ1, 0) and I |= fol(ψ2, 0).
So I |= fol(ψ1, 0) ∧ fol(ψ2, 0), i.e. I |= fol(ψ1 ∧ ψ2, 0) holds. On the other
hand, since I |= fol(ψ1 ∧ψ2, 0), I |= fol(ψ1, 0) and I |= fol(ψ2, 0) are true. By
induction hypothesis, we have that ρ is a good prefix for both ψ1 and ψ2. Thus ρ is
a good prefix for ψ1 ∧ ψ2;
– If ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff ρ is a good prefix for either ψ1 or ψ2.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ρ is a good prefix for ψ1. By induction
hypothesis, I |= fol(ψ1, 0) holds, thus I |= fol(ψ1 ∨ ψ2, 0) is true. The other
direction can be proved analogously.
– If ψ = Xψ1, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff suffix ρ′ = ρ1ρ2 . . . , ρ|ρ|−1 of ρ is a good
prefix for ψ1. Let I ′ be the corresponding interpretation of ρ′, thus every atom
p ∈ P satisfies i ∈ pI′ iff (i+ 1) ∈ pI . By induction hypothesis, I ′ |= fol(ψ1, 0)
holds, thus I |= fol(ψ1, 1) is true. Therefore, I |= fol(Xψ1, 0) holds.
– If ψ = ψ1Uψ2, ρ is a good prefix for ψ iff there exists i (0 ≤ i ≤ |ρ|− 1) such that
suffix ρ′ = ρiρi+1 . . . , ρ|ρ|−1 of ρ is a good prefix for ψ2. And for all j (0 ≤ j < i),
ρ′′ = ρjρj+1 . . . , ρi−1 is a good prefix for ψ1. Let I ′ and I ′′ be the corresponding
interpretations of ρ′ and ρ′′. Thus every atom p ∈ P satisfies that k ∈ pI′ iff
(i+ k) ∈ pI , k ∈ pI′′ iff (j + k) ∈ pI . By induction hypothesis, I ′ |= fol(ψ2, 0)
and I ′′ |= fol(ψ1, 0) holds. Thus I |= ∃i.0 ≤ i ≤ (|ρ| − 1) · fol(ψ2, i) and
I |= ∀j.0 ≤ j < i · fol(ψ1, j) hold. Therefore, I |= fol(ψ1Uψ2, 0).
MONA [18] is a tool that translates Weak Second-order Theory of One or Two suc-
cessors (WS1S/WS2S) [10] formula to minimal DFA, represented symbolically. WS1S
subsumes the First-Order Logic (FOL) over finite traces, which allows us to adopt
MONA to construct the DFA Aφ for Safety formula φ. Taking the assumption that
the DFA generated by MONA accepts exactly the same traces that satisfy fol(¬φ, 0),
which corresponds to Co-Safety LTL formula ¬φ, by Theorem 6 we can conclude that
the DFA returned by MONA is Aφ that accepts exactly the bad prefixes for the Safety
LTL formula φ.
Theorem 7. Let φ be a Safety LTL formula and Aφ be the DFA constructed by MONA
taking fol(¬φ, 0) as input. Finite trace ρ is a bad prefix for φ iff ρ is accepted by Aφ.
Deleting all transitions toward the accepting states in Aφ and removing the accept-
ing states of Aφ derives the safety automaton Asφ. To solve the Safety LTL synthesis
problem, we reduce the problem to a deterministic safety game over this automaton.
We first present the standard formulation and algorithm for solving such a game. Then,
since MONA constructs the DFA symbolically, we present a symbolic version of this
algorithm.
5.2 Solving Safety Games Symbolically
Computing a winning strategy of the safety game over DSA solves the synthesis prob-
lem. We base our symbolic approach on the algorithm from [9] for DFA (reachability)
games, which are the duals of safety games. In this section, we first describe the general
algorithm, which computes the set of winning states as a fixpoint. We then show how
to perform this computation symbolically using the symbolic representation of the state
graph constructed by MONA. Finally, we describe how we can use boolean synthesis to
extract a winning strategy from the symbolic representation of the set of winning states.
Consider a set of states E . The pre-image of E is a set Pre(E) = {s ∈ S | ∀X ∈
2X .∃Y ∈ 2Y .δ(s, (X,Y )) ∈ E}. That is, Pre(E) is the set of states from which,
regardless of the action of the environment, the controller can force the game into a
state in E . If the controller moves first, we swap the order of ∃Y ∈ 2Y and ∀X ∈ 2X to
compute the pre-image.
We define Win(As) as the greatest-fixpoint of Wini(As), which denotes the set of
states in which the controller can remain within i steps. This means thatWin(As) is the
set of states in which the controller can remain indefinitely, that is, the set of winning
states. The safety game is solved by computing the fixpoint as follows:
Win0(A
s) = S (1)
Wini+1(A
s) = Wini(A
s) ∩ Pre(Wini(As)) (2)
That is, we start with the set of all states and at each iteration remove those states from
which the controller cannot force the game to remain in the current set.
For realizability checking, if s0 ∈Win(As), then the game is realizable, otherwise
the game is unrealizable. We also consider an early-termination heuristic to speed up the
realizability checking: after each computation of Wini(As), if s0 /∈ Wini(As), then
return unrealizable. To generate the strategy, we define a deterministic finite transducer
T = (2X , 2Y , Q, s0, %, ω) based on the set Win(As), where: Q = Win(As) is the
set of winning states; % : Q × 2X → Q is the transition function such that %(q,X) =
δ(q,X ∪ Y ) and Y = ω(q,X); ω : Q × 2X → 2Y is the output function, where
ω(q,X) = Y such that δ(q,X ∪Y ) ∈ Q. Note that there are many possible choices for
the output function ω. The transducer T defines a winning strategy by restricting ω to
return only one possible setting of Y .
Following the construction in Section 5.1, MONA produces a symbolic represen-
tation of the DFA Aφ which accepts all bad prefixes of the Safety LTL formula φ.
Therefore, in this section we show how to derive a DSA and solve the correspond-
ing safety game from this representation. Following [29], we define a symbolic DFA
as A = (X ,Y,Z, Z0, η, f), where: X is a set of input variables; Y is a set of output
variables; Z is a set of state variables; Z0 ∈ 2Z is the assignment to the state proposi-
tions corresponding to the initial state; η : 2X × 2Y × 2Z → 2Z is a boolean function
mapping assignments X , Y and Z of the variables of X , Y and Z to a new assignment
Z ′ of the variables of Z; f is a boolean formula over the propositions in Z , such that f
is satisfied by an interpretation Z iff Z corresponds to an accepting state.
GivenA, the corresponding safety automaton As = (2X∪Y , S, s0, δ) that avoids all
bad prefixes accepted by A is defined by: X and Y are the same as in the definition of
A; S = {Z ∈ 2Z | Z 6|= f}; s0 = Z0; δ : S × 2X∪Y → S is the partial function such
that δ(Z,X ∪ Y ) = η(X,Y, Z) if Z ∈ S, and is undefined otherwise.
Lemma 1. If Aφ is a symbolic DFA that accepts exactly the bad prefixes of a Safety
LTL formula φ, then Asφ is a deterministic safety automaton for φ.
This correspondence allows us to use the symbolic representation of A to compute
the solution of the safety game defined by As. To compute the set of winning states, we
represent the set Wini(As) by a boolean formula wi in terms of the state variables Z ,
such that an assignment Z ∈ 2Z satisfies wi if and only if the state represented by Z is
in Wini(As). We define w0 = ¬f and wi+1(Z) = wi(Z) ∧ ∀X.∃Y.wi(η(X,Y, Z)),
which correspond respectively to (1) and (2) above. The fixpoint computation termi-
nates once wi+1 ≡ wi, at which point we define w = wi, representing Win(As). We
can then test for realizability by checking if the assignment Z0 representing the initial
state satisfies w.
Theorem 8. The safety game defined by As is realizable if and only if Z0 |= w.
If Z0 |= w, then we wish to construct a transducer T = (2X , 2Y , Q, s0, %, ω) rep-
resenting a winning strategy. We define Q = {Z ∈ 2Z | Z |= w}, s0 = Z0 and
%(Z,X, Y ) = η(X,Y, Z) if η(X,Y, Z) ∈ Q and undefined otherwise. To construct ω,
we can use a boolean-synthesis procedure. Recall that the input to this procedure is a
boolean formula ϕ, a set of input variables I and a set of output variables O. In our
case, ϕ(Z,X, Y ) = w(η(X,Y, Z)), I = Z∪X andO = Y . The result of the synthesis
is a boolean function ω : 2Z∪X → 2Y . Then, from the definition of boolean synthesis it
follows that if the output is chosen by ω the game remains in the set of winning states.
That is, if Z ∈ 2Z satisfies w, then for all X ∈ 2X , η(Z,X, ω(Z ∪X)) also satisfies w.
6 Experimental Evaluation
6.1 Implementation
Explicit Approach The main algorithm for the explicit approach consists of three
steps: DSA construction, Horn formula generation and SAT solving for synthesis. We
adopted SPOT [12] as the DSA constructor since the output automata should be deter-
ministic. Generating the Horn formula follows the rules described in Section 4. Further-
more, here we used Minisat-2.2 [13] for SAT solving. Decoding the variables that are
assigned with the truth in the assignment returned by Minisat-2.2 [13] is able to generate
the strategy if the Safety LTL formula is realizable with respect to 〈inputs, outputs〉.
Symbolic Encoding We implemented the symbolic framework for Safety LTL syn-
thesis in the SSyft tool, which is written in C++ and utilizes the BDD library CUDD-
3.0.0 [28]. The entire framework consists of two steps: the DSA construction and the
safety game over the DSA. In the first step, the dual of the DSA, a DFA is constructed
via MONA [18] and represented as a Shared Multi-terminal BDD (ShMTBDD) [5, 18].
From this ShMTBDD, we construct a representation of the transition relation η by a
sequence B = 〈B0, B1, . . . , Bn−1〉 of BDDs. Each Bi, when evaluated over an assign-
ment of X ∪ Y , outputs an assignment to a state variable zi ∈ Z . The boolean formula
f representing the accepting states of the DFA is likewise encoded as a BDD Bf .
To perform the fixpoint computation, we construct a sequence 〈Bw0 , Bw1 , . . . , Bwi〉
of BDDs, whereBwi is the BDD representation of the formulawi.Bwi+1 is constructed
from Bwi by substituting each state variable zi with the corresponding BDD Bi, which
can be achieved by the Compose operation in CUDD. Moreover, CUDD provides the
operations UnivAbstract and ExistAbstract for universal and existential quantifier elim-
ination respectively. The fixpoint computation benefits from the canonicity of BDDs
by checking the equivalence of Bwi+1 and Bwi . To check realizability we use the Eval
operation. Since in our construction the state variables appear at the top of the BDDs,
we use the Input-First boolean-synthesis procedure introduced in [16] to synthesize the
winning strategy if the game is realizable.
6.2 Experimental Methodology
To show the efficiency of the methods proposed in this paper, we compare our tool
SSyft based on the symbolic framework and the explicit approach, named as Horn SAT,
with extant LTL synthesis tools Unbeast [14] and Acacia+ [4]. Both of the LTL synthesis
tools can use either SPOT [12] or LTL2BA [17] for the automata construction. From our
preliminary evaluation, both Unbeast and Acacia+ perform better when they construct
automata using LTL2BA. As a result, LTL2BA is the default LTL-to-automata translator
of Unbeast and Acacia+ in our experiments. All tests are ran on a platform whose
operating system is 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04, with a 2.4 GHz CPU (Intel Core i7) and 8 GB
of memory. The timeout was set to be 60 seconds (s).
Input Formulas Our benchmark formulas are collected from [14], called LoadBal-
ancer. Since not all cases are safe, here we propose a class of Expansion Formulas for
safety-property generation. Consider an LTL formula φ in NNF. We use a transformation
function ef(φ, l) that given φ and a parameter l, which represents the expansion length,
returns a Safety LTL formula. The function ef() works in the following way: (1) For
each subformula of the form φ1Uφ2, expand to φ2 ∨ (φ1 ∧X(φ1Uφ2)) for l− 1 times;
(2) Substitute the remaining φ1Uφ2 with φ2. Note that Safety formulas are Until-free in
NNF, thus for LTL formulas in NNF, it is not necessary to deal with the Release operator.
The intuition of the expansion is to bound the satisfied length of φ1Uφ2 by adding the
Next(X) operator. The parameter l scales to 5 in our test, for each length there are 79
instances. And 395 cases in total.
Correctness The correctness of our implementation was evaluated by comparing
the results from our approaches with those from Acacia+ and Unbeast. For the solved
cases, we never encountered an inconsistency.
6.3 Results
We evaluated the performance of SSyft and Horn SAT in terms of the number of solved
cases and the running time. Our experiments demonstrate that the symbolic approach
we introduced here significantly improves the effectiveness of Safety LTL synthesis. The
safety game has two versions, depending on which player (environment or controller)
moves first. Both our tool SSyft and Acacia+ are able to handle these two kinds of
games, while Unbeast supports only games with the environment moving first. As a
result, we only consider the comparison on the environment-moving-first game. We
aim to compare the results on two aspects: 1) the scalability on the expansion length; 2)
the number of solved cases in the given time limit.
Fig. 1 shows the number of solved cases for each expansion length (1-5)4. As shown
in the figure, SSyft solves approximately twice as many cases as the other three tools.
The advantage of SSyft diminishes as the expansion length grows, because MONA can-
not generate the automata for such cases. Neither of Acacia+ and Unbeast can solve
these cases even in a small expansion length. Horn SAT performs similarly as SSyft
when l = 1, which derives smaller DSA. The performance of Horn SAT decreases
sharply as the size of the DSA grows, since formula generation dominates the synthesis
time. In total, SSyft solves a total of 339 cases, while Acacia+, Unbeast and Horn SAT
solve 182, 132 and 159 cases, respectively.
The scatter plot for the total time comparison is shown in Fig. 2, where + plots
the data for SSyft against Acacia+, 4 plots the data for SSyft against Unbeast and ◦
is for Horn SAT. Clearly, SSyft outperforms the other three tools. The results shown
in Fig. 2 confirm the claim that the symbolic approach is much more efficient than
Acacia+ and Unbeast. In some cases, Horn SAT performs better than SSyft, nevertheless
in general SSyft has a significant advantage. Thus, the evidence here indicates that both
the symbolic approach and the explicit method introduced in this paper contribute to
the improvement of the overall performance of Safety LTL synthesis.
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7 Concluding Remarks
We presented here a simple but efficient approach to Safety LTL synthesis based on the
observation that a minimal DFA can be constructed for Co-Safety LTL formula. Fur-
thermore, a deterministic safety automaton (DSA) can be generated from the DFA, and
4 We recommend viewing the figures online for better readability.
a symbolic safety game can be solved over the DSA. A comparison with the reduction
to Horn-SAT confirms better scalability of the symbolic approach. Further experiments
show that the new approach outperforms existing solutions for general LTL synthesis.
Both the DSA construction and the symbolic safety game solution contribute to the im-
provement. It will be interesting to apply our approach to the safety-first method [27]
for LTL synthesis.
It should be noted, however, that symbolic DSA construction cannot avoid the worst
case doubly exponential complexity: it can only make the synthesis simpler and more
efficient in practice. Our experiments show that the bottleneck is manifested when
the input Safety LTL formula gets larger, and DSA construction becomes unachiev-
able within the reasonable time. A promising solution may be to develop an on-the-fly
method to perform the DSA construction and solve the safety game at the same time.
We leave this to our future work.
Beyond general LTL-synthesis approaches, another relevant work is on GR(1) syn-
thesis [3]. Although GR(1) synthesis aims to handle a fragment of general LTL as well,
it is not comparable to Safety LTL, since GR(1) does not allow arbitrary nesting of the
Release (R) and Next (X) operators. For that reason, our experiments do not cover the
comparison between our approach and GR(1) synthesis. Another work related is synthe-
sis of the GXW fragment [8]. In this fragment, input formulas are conjuction of certain
pattern formulas expressed using the temporal connectives G, X , and W . Because of
the limitation to six specific patterns, this fragment is quite less general that the Safety
LTL fragment studied here.
Our work is also related to the safety-synthesis track of the Annual Synthesis Com-
petition (SyntComp). While the Safety-LTL-synthesis problem can, in principle, be re-
duced to safety synthesis, the reduction is quite nontrivial. Safety-synthesis tools from
SyntComp take AIGER models5 as input, while our approach takes Safety LTL formu-
las as input. A symbolic DSA can be encoded as an AIGER model by adding additional
variables to encode intermediate BDD nodes. As we saw, however, the construction of
symbolic DSAs is a very demanding part of Safety LTL synthesis, with a worst-case
doubly exponential complexity, so the usefulness of such a reduction is questionable.
We have shown here a new symbolic approach to Safety LTL synthesis, in which a
more efficient automata-construction technique is utilized. Experiments show that our
new approach outperforms existing solutions to general LTL synthesis, as well as a new
reduction of safety games to Horn SAT.
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A Appendix
We also compare the approaches in terms of the impact of the result of the formula
(realizable/unrealizable). As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, we separate the realizable
and unrealizable results to explore how our new approaches perform on each category.
The results show that SSyft takes an obvious advantage on solving unrealizable cases.
This happens because SSyft benefits from the early-termination realizability-checking
heuristic; that is, the checking of whether the initial state s0 is in Wini(S) is invoked
after each iteration i ≥ 0 of computing the set of winning states, i.e. Wini(S). Note
that s0 is in Win0(S) initially, since s0 is assumed to be a winning state. If s0 is not in
Wini(S) for some i, s0 is no longer a winning state such that the realizability checking
indeed returns unrealizable. The explicit approach, Horn SAT, performs similarly as
Acacia+ on realizable cases, while on unrealizable cases, Acacia+ has advantageous on
Horn SAT. In general, Horn SAT performs better than Unbeast, although Unbeast has
clear advantage on realizable cases.
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